

# Geostrategic Imperative of the Indo-Pacific Region

## Emerging Trends and Regional Responses

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**Indo-Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospects**

edited by Rajiv K. Bhatia and Vijay Sakhuja, New Delhi: Vij Book and Indian Council of World Affairs, 2014, pp. xvi+185, INR 850

**Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific**

edited by Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh, New Delhi: KW Publishers and National Maritime Foundation, 2014, pp. xx+138, INR 680

The global economic power shift from the West to East (Asia) and the increasing geostrategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region has resulted in cooperation and competition among the established and rising powers in the region. While the economic cooperation between them has significantly grown in recent past, the geostrategic and geopolitical frameworks remain very uncertain. In essence, the emerging trends and issues in the Indo-Pacific offer unique opportunities as well as daunting challenges to the nations. These developments have generated great interest and debate among the researchers, academics as well as policymakers circles across the world. While David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, in their 2014 book, have analysed the maritime policy challenges and opportunities arising across the Indian Ocean and the

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Western Pacific region,<sup>1</sup> C. Raja Mohan, in his 2013 book, has discussed the increasing maritime and geopolitical competition between rising China and emerging India in the region.<sup>2</sup> Hemant Krishan Singh and Sanjay Pulipaka, in their 2013 policy studies report, have demonstrated the transformation of India's relationship with the United States (US) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>3</sup> Patrick M. Cronin's 2012 report has examined the growing Chinese military assertiveness and territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and the future of US foreign policy strategy in the SCS and the overall impact of territorial disputes on the maritime commons.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Ashley J. Tellis' 2014 report analyses the threat posed by rising China to American foreign policy interests in the region and offers a balanced politico-military and economic approach to deal with assertive China.<sup>5</sup> Thus, though the literatures on the subject have grown in proportions, they remain scattered and many important issues have not been addressed as a whole. The two volumes under review aim to fill that void and to clarify existing ambiguities in the literature.

In this endeavour, the first volume, titled *Indo-Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospects*, is a compilation of 17 papers presented by senior officials and scholars from different countries, including China, Japan, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Russia, in the Asian Relations Conference IV (ARCIV), which was held by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi, in 2013. The book begins with the keynote address given by then External Affairs Minister of India, Salman Khurshid, on the resurgence of Asia and India's engagements with the Indo-Pacific region. The volume analyses the emerging concept of the Indo-Pacific as an overarching geopolitical and geo-economic imagination. It also addresses new challenges in political, economic and maritime domains from different regions and countries perspectives. The second volume, *Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific*, is an outcome of the proceedings of Annual Maritime Power Conference held by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, in 2013, where research scholars, academics, military representatives and practitioners from various countries such as the US, China, Japan, India, South Africa, Australia and the Philippines deliberated upon a wide range of issues relating to the region. The volume has 15 chapters which are divided into four thematic subgroups: the strategic meta-narrative; the US rebalance and regional perspective; conflict and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; and geopolitical challenges and non-traditional threats.

In fact, these two volumes collectively encompass almost the entire gamut of issues and trends in the region, including geostrategic imperative of the Indo-Pacific, global power shift from the West to the East, the US rebalance, rising China and its implications, geopolitics and great power competition, traditional and non-traditional security challenges, maritime security, regional security architecture and regional responses, which are currently subjects of great debate and have critical geostrategic implications for the immediate and extended regions of the world. The present review essay primarily discusses some of the key issues and trends pertaining to the region and their strategic implications for India and its responses.

#### **INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

The Indo-Pacific region is an emerging geostrategic and geo-economic concept that has been gaining significance in the field of defence and security studies. It is the geographical connotation of the area which covers the Eastern Coast of Africa through Indian Ocean and Western Pacific Ocean. It has recently gained wide acceptance in geopolitical circles. The concept can also be seen as a natural corollary to that of India's Look East Policy (LEP), which India has been following over the last two decades.<sup>6</sup> The LEP has not only helped India in reviving its traditional relationship with the South-East and East Asian countries but also interlinking across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Modi government has recently renewed India's LEP into an 'Act East Policy', which not only seeks to increase the people-to-people contact and greater connectivity in the region but also seeks to play a larger and active role in this vital region.

Indeed, the Indo-Pacific 'forms a composite entity of sea regions and littorals marked by a multiplicity of cultures, ethnicities, religions, economic models and governance structures. A common link binding the diverse subsystems within the Indo-Pacific is the sea.'<sup>7</sup> In this regard, Lawrence W. Prabhakar has analysed the concept by seven approaches: constructivism, balance of power, global power shift, strategic autonomy choices, concert of democracies, Indo-Pacific regionalism and Indo-Pacific commons.<sup>8</sup> In essence, the Indo-Pacific envisages new frameworks that feature competitive and convergence security interests which are evident in the light of global power shift to the region. Importantly, the maritime powers, such as Australia, China, Japan, India and the US, determine the pivot of the Indo-Pacific region, while they seek to dominate and influence each other to achieve their national goals.

### GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

Both the volumes underscore the increasingly geostrategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region to the region's and the world's peace and prosperity. It, in fact, represents the centre of gravity of the world's economic, political and strategic interests. It is rich in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons which fuel the industrial engines of the world's economies. The established and emerging powers are competing over these resources. In recent years, with the global economic power shift, it has swiftly emerged as a centre of international trade and investments. It indeed embodies a large market which is defined by nearly half of the world's population. This is obvious from the economic issues currently dominating the regional politics.

In this context, regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation and maritime security have become very important as over 90 per cent of the world's trade by volume is by sea. The region consists of many of the world's vital choke points for global commerce, including the Straits of Malacca which is very critical for the growth of world economy. In addition, 'the boom in port construction has only heightened the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific and this in turn is likely to generate greater commercial traffic and the possibility for greater strategic competition'.<sup>9</sup>

In the recent past, the increasing flow of raw materials, oil and gas into the region has led to the rise of Asia. Labour, capital and consumer goods are also increasingly flowing from Asia to other regions of the world. As a matter of fact, the region constitutes the engine of global economic growth and development. In this regard, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, former Chief of the Indian Navy, rightly points out that the geostrategic imperative of the region as the global strategic growth and expansion of aspiring powers can be contained and regulated through the control of the movements of goods and key choke points in the region.<sup>10</sup>

### SECURITY CHALLENGES

The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a significant geostrategic space and a theatre of Great Power competition and rivalry. While traditional rivalries over maritime territory, sovereignty and resources have intensified among the regional countries, the rise of non-traditional threats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and climate change have thrown new challenges for the nation-states. The centrality of the region is however

its natural resources, energy and international trade, which, as described by Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh, renders the regions 'stability critical, the looming threat of maritime crime and environmental crises in the region make it an area of vital concern for maritime forces.'<sup>11</sup>

The nature of these security challenges in the region has considerable transnational implications which require international cooperative response. In addition, the region has emerged as highly volatile, with proliferation of nuclear and missile weapons. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate at Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, in his article published in the *Asian Strategic Review 2014: US Pivot and Asian Security*, has examined the implications of the Obama administrations rebalance strategy for nuclearisation of Asia.<sup>12</sup> He points out that the rebalance strategy has had limited impact in curbing the proliferation of such weapons as the US has failed to control the role of China and North Korea in their nuclearisation programme.<sup>13</sup> This will have serious security implications as the countries that are not protected by the nuclear umbrella will be under tremendous pressure to nuclearise.

Consequently, these developments have created a new security environment in the region amidst a rising assemblage of economic and political powers such as China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. However, Kaushiva and Singh, in their volume, point out that the key issues in the strategically significant region are the impressive economic growth rates, maritime security capability redistribution, revisionist power and new-found nationalistic assertions.<sup>14</sup>

#### THE US REBALANCE STRATEGY

The US rebalance strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region is an important foreign policy contribution of the Obama administration. It is a comprehensive strategy which aims to protect and promote American national interests in the region by accelerating its economic and diplomatic engagements with its traditional allies and emerging partners, namely, India and Indonesia. It also has military, strategic and ideological dimensions. It is essentially driven by the geostrategic imperative of the economically fast-growing Indo-Pacific and its implications for the US interests and dominance in the region. The two volumes have extensively dwelt upon the subject.

The volumes under review, indeed, point out that the US rebalance strategy is primarily a result of three fundamental reasons: (a) rise of

China and its assertive foreign policy has created geostrategic flux in the Indo-Pacific region, which poses serious military, economic and political challenges to the US interests in the region; (b) the US, after exhausting military and economic resources over a decade-long involvement in the Greater West Asia crisis, seeks to shift its focus to the world's fastest-growing region (Indo-Pacific) for reviving its economy as well as creating jobs and new opportunities for Americans; and (c) it also seeks to correct its imbalance in power projection in the world by repositioning its military forces and resurrecting its leadership in the region as a Pacific power.

Thus, as the geostrategic significance of the region has rapidly increased, the US has redefined its broader foreign policy engagement with the region. It strongly believes that its foreign policy interests would be best served by moving from an earlier emphasis on just the 'Asia-Pacific region' to one based on a broader 'Indo-Pacific region'. The US also states that peace, stability and freedom of navigation are crucial for the entire region's prosperity, including that of the US and China. However, it cautions Beijing over China's aggressive posture in the region and territorial claims, which are viewed by Washington as against the international norms and will destabilise the region. Therefore, for protecting and promoting American foreign policy interests in the region, it wants to 'play a larger and a long term role in shaping this region and its future'<sup>15</sup> by instituting new regional economic and security architectures. However, the US rebalance strategy is still evolving. And there are important questions and doubts arising on its feasibility, given the US financial constraints, deeper involvement in the West Asian crisis and the military commitment and capability to protect its allies and partners in case of a major conflict.

#### CHINA FACTOR

Rising China is clearly a key factor in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in the US rebalancing strategy, which both volumes have highlighted to a great extent. It has been pointed out that China's rise is swiftly altering the geostrategic equations in the region. Its assertive foreign policy, backed by growing economic and military power, has also changed the geo-economics and geopolitics of the region.<sup>16</sup> Though China's rise has benefited regional countries in the economic field, its increasing expenditure on military modernisation and power projection, particularly in the East and South China Seas, have caused major concerns for them,

including for the US. Moreover, while the US still remains the most powerful country in the world in terms of its military and economic power, China's growing comprehensive national power has created important strategic space for itself. It is, however, China's nationalistic leadership and aggressive pursuit of national interests that has created a regional flux. Regional and extra-regional countries are therefore trying to fix this regional flux by founding new regional economic and security architectures. In this regard, the US' rebalance strategy is seen as an attempt to address this strategic flux.

On the other hand, Beijing perceives the rebalance strategy as an attempt to contain China and doubts the US' growing engagements with its regional allies and emerging powers. China's maritime boundary claims, increasing military activities in the East and South China Seas and nationalist rhetoric are seen as China's strategy to keep the US out of its sphere of influence. It is also following a periphery strategy which aims at developing good relationship with its east, south and western neighbours. It seeks to achieve this goal not through multilateral approach, but rather by increasing bilateral engagements. This aggressive Chinese approach has certainly generated severe uncertainties and dangerous security situations in the region. Authors in the two volumes have dwelt upon these issues in detail, and also underline their geostrategic implications for the region and beyond. Although Chinese scholars highlight China as an important force for regional peace, stability and prosperity, analysts from the US, Japan, Australia and other countries apparently disagree with China's ambiguous and assertive foreign policy.

Most of the scholars recognise and recommend the urgency of removing those ambiguities in Chinese defence and foreign policy. It is believed that China could do this by bringing more transparency in its defence expenditure and constructively engaging with the neighbouring countries to resolve the fundamental strategic issues where high stakes are involved. Failing to do so will have severe repercussions on the regional peace and security in coming years.

#### **REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES**

Scholars have presented a mixed regional response to these emerging trends and issues in the Indo-Pacific. While the region's growing economy and trade has created greater scope for regional economic integration in the last few years, China's assertive foreign policy has led to deeper uncertainties among the regional countries about peace and stability of

the region. Rising China's growing economic and military power has also created a widening gap between them.

Consequently, most of the US' regional allies and partners welcome the rebalance strategy, which they believe would help in balancing China's growing economic and military assertions in the region. At the same time, they seek to constructively engage with rising China, which they consider important for the region's overall peace and prosperity. Moreover, it is also not possible and practical for either side to keep rising China isolated in the time of increasing economic interdependence in the world.

For obvious reasons, China strongly resents the rebalance strategy and continues to leverage its power in shaping the future dynamics of the region. In this situation, even if the US continues to emphasise its commitment to pursue its rebalance strategy, America's regional allies and emerging partners, including Japan, Australia, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, doubt its ability to provide support in decisive situations. Caesar C. Taccad, Tomoko Kiyota, Yuki Sekiguchi and Sumathy Permal, in their respective chapters, have also pointed out the suspicions among the regional countries on the US sustaining the strategy in the long term, given the relative decline of its economic power vis-à-vis China.<sup>17</sup> They point out that the rise of non-traditional security challenges has made regional cooperation imperative.

### REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The security environment in the Indo-Pacific region is complicated by maritime boundary disputes in the SCS, disagreement over territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal, Great Power competition, in addition to the emergence of non-traditional security challenges such as piracy, drug and human trafficking, terrorism and climate change. The situation in the Western Pacific region however remains very complex and volatile in contrast to a rather stable situation in the Indian Ocean.

Presently, there are a number of institutional arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region which seek to address both economic and security problems. However, they have limited success in these because of divergent approaches and competing national interests. The big challenge before them is therefore to create effective institutional mechanisms both for promoting collective economic benefits and countering common security threats. Authors in both the volumes emphasise the greater need of clear



principles, governing rules and multilateral frameworks for building such regional architectures.

In this regard, the major powers of the region, including Japan, China and India, have to play a leading role in formulating a common idea. They need to make sustained efforts and build greater foreign policy coherence. In addition, greater cultural and people-to-people contacts will help in promoting such cooperation. These institutionalisations of the Indo-Pacific could promote overall peace, security and prosperity in the region, which is the common goal of the countries of this region.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

India's relationship with the South-East and East Asian countries is very traditional. It has revived this traditional relationship through its LEP in the early 1990s, and recently through 'Act East Policy' under the Modi government. India's engagements with the two vital sub-regions of Asia have been enhanced at economic, defence, politico-diplomatic and strategic levels. It currently conducts its bilateral relationship at the level of 'strategic partnerships' with Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, China and Australia. India's strategic relationship with the ASEAN and the US has dramatically developed over the last one decade. There is also an India–Japan–Australia–US quadrilateral and India–Japan–US trilateral partnership. India's strategic partners in the region not only seek to further strengthen their ties with India on a wide range of issues, including trade and investment, defence, maritime security, science and technology and disaster management, but also urge India to play a more proactive role in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The US, in particular, considers India as a 'linchpin' in its rebalancing strategy towards the region. It is perceived that strengthening the relationship between the world's largest democracies will help promote regional peace and stability as they share common values, interests as well as common security challenges in the twenty-first century. Through India's LEP and the US' rebalancing strategy, the two countries have further built a new synergy in their regional relationship.

There is, however, concern that 'the Indian Ocean Region could witness a major military surge by China, turning it into an arena of great power competition in Asia.'<sup>18</sup> China has rapidly developed its relationship with Indian Ocean rim countries, which is perceived as a 'string of pearls' strategy, to contain emerging India. In response to the Chinese strategy,

India has sought to further improve its naval and security cooperation with the South-East and East Asian countries, including Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc.

However, India's strategic leverage, particularly in East Asia, is not comparable with that of China's growing clout in the Eastern Indian Ocean. China has recently gained its influence in the region by funding huge maritime infrastructure projects such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. These infrastructural facilities currently may be for commercial purposes but, according to Mehta, they also 'have a considerable scope for military applications'. He further observes that 'China's ability to put India under strain in the Indian Ocean is a growing factor shaping the broader dynamic of Asian security.'<sup>19</sup> In addition, the rise of non-traditional security threats, maritime boundary claims and Great Power competition over resources has further broadened the security challenges for India.<sup>20</sup> In this rapidly changing geostrategic and geo-economic landscape of the Indo-Pacific, India's future prosperity and overall security lies in its ability to effectively connect to the two regions, as well as maintaining peace and stability in it.

#### INDIA'S RESPONSES

India has its own geostrategic imperative in its growing engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. It has been developing a multidirectional engagement with the regional and extra-regional powers to protect and promote its national interests. Over the years, it has emerged as a key regional player and created important strategic space for itself. It recognises the ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific and looks to play a key role in shaping the economic and security architectures. However, despite India's improved relationship with the regional countries, there is a widespread feeling that there is lack of integration with these countries. In this regard, India looks to integrate its north-eastern region with South-East Asia by enhancing economic cooperation, connectivity, cultural and people-to-people exchange and capacity building.

On countering the emerging security challenges in this region, India's policy aims 'to encourage and participate in cooperative approach which would enable all countries in the region to counter traditional and non-traditional security challenges and to ensure that the critical sea lanes are kept open, secure and free for navigation and trade.'<sup>21</sup> India stands for freedom of navigation and security of the sea lanes of communication

as per the international law. It is poised to become 'a net provider of security' in the Indian Ocean region and beyond.

China also has had a deep engagement with the countries of the region. Importantly, despite having outstanding bilateral problems including the border problem, India–China relationship has significantly improved in recent years, particularly in the economic field, with a bilateral annual trade of nearly \$70 billion in 2013. However, China has some misgivings about India's growing engagement with the regional and extra-regional countries, especially with the US and Japan. In this regard, it is clearly articulated in the volumes that China must see India's legitimate interests in the Indo-Pacific and adjust its policy accordingly. Meanwhile, India tries to maintain a fine balance in its strategic relations with the regional countries vis-à-vis China. It seeks to 'engage with China on the principles of mutual trust and respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns.'<sup>22</sup>

As the geostrategic significance of the Indo-Pacific has grown in recent years, India must utilise the opportunities arising in the region. There is a prevailing perception that it has been slow in maximising the benefits that are arising from the global power shift because of domestic political constraints. It, therefore, needs to have a comprehensive and a long-term strategy towards the region to protect and promote its foreign policy interests. It also needs to play an active role in building regional economic and security architectures. As an indispensable part of the Indo-Pacific, it must shape the evolving geostrategic landscape of the region by engaging in regular dialogues and processes. It is observed that failing to do so could adversely affect its long-term strategic interests in the region. However, as a rising Asian power, India is poised to play a larger role in the region.

Furthermore, India ardently believes that peace, stability, security and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region will be critical to regional peace and prosperity, as well as to its own development. The coming of the Modi government to power in May 2014 with a historic mandate, and its 'Act East Policy', has provided a new impetus to India's engagements with this vital region. It now looks to develop close strategic partnerships with regional and extra-regional countries in building regional economic and security architectures. However, India's continued domestic economic development, peace and stability at home and the nature of its relationship with South Asian countries will largely determine the future direction of its engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

### ASSESSMENT

As the global economy's centre of gravity continues to shift from the West to the East (Asia) with growing geostrategic significance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it is most likely that the regional and extra-regional countries will find ways to form new economic and strategic partnerships. The countries in the Indo-Pacific region, however, need to intensify their cooperation on maritime safety and security, disaster management, job creation and health, fisheries and marine resources management, science and technology and environment. Importantly, there is huge potential for economic integration of the region. Institutionalisation of an Indo-Pacific Regional Economic Architecture could yield greater economic benefits. Besides, greater cultural and people-to-people interactions will strengthen regional cooperation and can dispel much of the prevailing misperceptions.

With regard to China's growing influence in the region and its security implications for India and other regional countries, there exists a wide pessimism, particularly in the Western analyses. It is quite pertinent to point out here that the India–China relationship is nicely balanced between the elements of cooperation and conflict, like that of the US–China relationship. Especially, there is enough space in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond to accommodate both rising China and India. They can co-exist and grow peacefully.

However, the trends and issues will ostensibly continue to unfold in the region with greater worrying security concerns. In the coming years, maritime security within the Indo-Pacific region will be a key factor in the development of many countries. It, however, remains a major concern in the area because of the growing non-traditional security threats, in addition to maritime boundary disputes. Particularly, events in the SCS will continue to attract much of the regional and international attention. These could possibly engulf the regional and international stakeholder's capability to maintain peace, security and stability within the region in a sustained and effective manner.

Most importantly, countries in the Indo-Pacific region share many of these common concerns. Invigorating greater cooperation and coherence in their strategy could help address the problems collectively. Moreover, establishing an Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture will be very handy in addressing the common security concerns and threats.

The two volumes together comprehensively describe and analyse these trends and issues that are immensely relevant to the peace, stability,

security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years. The efforts made in the volumes will definitely help policymakers of stakeholding countries in identifying areas of mutual interests and in formulating policies for developing cooperation to address the various challenges collectively. Furthermore, the chapters in the volumes under review meticulously elucidate regional and other countries perspectives. They holistically assess the security needs and emphasise the urgent measures that the concerned countries need to take for addressing the prevailing fault lines in the region.

Though the authors bring out diverse perspectives in their analyses of the issues, they highlight the greater readiness and cooperation among the regional countries to undertake effective and expeditious measures to address the traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the region for creating peaceful and stable regional security environment. These two volumes have surely broadened the scope of the debate and area valuable contribution to the field, and will be very helpful to research scholars, academics and policymakers for a comprehensive understanding of the issues pertaining to the Indo-Pacific region.

#### NOTES

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8. Lawrence W. Prabhakar, 'The Emergent Vistas of the Indo-Pacific', in Bhatia and Sakhuja, n. 6, pp. 5–10, 15.
9. Mehta, 'The Indo-Pacific Imperative', n. 7, p. 4.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
11. Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh (eds), *Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific*, New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., in association with National Maritime Foundation, 2014, p. xi.
12. See Rajiv Nayan, 'Pivot to Asia and Nuclearisation', in S.D. Muni and Vivek Chadha (eds), *Asian Strategic Review 2014: US Pivot and Asian Security*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, in association with IDSA, 2014, pp. 189–210.
13. *Ibid.*
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15. Remarks by US President Barack Obama to the Australian Parliament, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, 17 November 2011 at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>, last accessed on 24 December 2012.
16. See Daniel P. Leaf, 'Indo-Pacific Region: Perspectives from the US', pp. 107–109 and Chan Git Yin, 'ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific Region', pp. 70–82, in Bhatia and Sakhuja, *Indo-Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospects*, n. 6; and Justin Jones, 'Australia's Indo-Pacific Imperative', pp. 37–44 and Caesar C. Taccad, 'A View from Philippines', pp. 77–84, in Kaushiva and Singh, *Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific*, n. 7.
17. Taccad, 'A View from Philippines', pp. 77–84, Tomoko Kiyota, 'Japan's South China Sea Conundrum', pp. 71–76; Yuki Sekiguchi, 'A Model of Collaborative Security for the Indo-Pacific', pp. 85–90 and Sumathy Permal, 'Indo-Pacific Region: Perspectives from Southeast and East Asia', pp. 51–69, in Kaushiva and Singh, *Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific*, n. 7.
18. Mehta, 'The Indo-Pacific Imperative', n. 7, p. 5.
19. *Ibid.*
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