Conceptualisations of Guerrilla Warfare

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Abstract

Guerrilla warfare is not a new phenomenon and history is witness to its repeated occurrence. In the modern era, it acquired prominence during the Napoleonic Wars which led to an examination of its role by leading nineteenth-century thinkers including Clausewitz, Jomini, Marx and Engels. Over the course of the subsequent century, the concept and practice of guerrilla warfare was integrated within social, economic and political programmes that aimed to overthrow established authority and transform society through an armed struggle. The link that was forged in the mid-nineteenth century by Italian and Polish revolutionaries like Carlo Bianco and Mazzini achieved fruition in the writings and practice of Mao tse-Tung in the twentieth century. This paper traces such conceptualisations of guerrilla warfare.

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Definition

The term 'Guerrilla Warfare' entered the modern lexicon during the Napoleonic Wars.[1] It is a form of warfare, meaning a technique or method used to pursue an objective, as opposed to a type of war like Total War or Limited War. In Samuel Huntington's comprehensive definition:

> *Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places.* Guerrilla warfare is the weapon of the weak. It is never chosen in preference to regular warfare; it is employed only when and where the possibilities of regular warfare have been foreclosed.[2]

It is thus generally employed: by small bands of irregulars fighting a superior invading army or to weaken the latter's hold over conquered territory; by a weaker side, or as a supplementary means in a conventional war; and in the preliminary stages of a revolutionary war that aims at overthrowing the existing political authority. Guerrilla strategy is determined by the rebels' weakness in relation to the superior military forces that they confront. Since weakness precludes a direct trial of strength in open battle, guerrillas necessarily aim at denying military victory to their

opponents. Writing on the Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger pithily observed:

> We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.[3]

The guerrilla strategy of denial does not aim at control over territory. Instead, hit-and-run operations and ambushes are carried out to loosen state control over territory and population. Consequently, the armament needs of guerrillas are limited to light weapons. Guerrilla warfare is thus relatively cheap to wage, though it is rather expensive to counter.[4] The guerrilla's goal is to impose costs on the adversary in terms of loss of soldiers, supplies, infrastructure, peace of mind, and most importantly, time. In other words, guerrilla war is designed "to destroy not the capacity but the will" of the adversary.[5]

An Adjunct to Conventional War

Guerrilla warfare emerged as a major phenomenon in the study of war in the aftermath of the Spanish-Portuguese guerrilla operations against French occupation forces in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Since in the overall analysis these rebel operations were seen as a comparatively minor component of the Napoleonic Wars, post-war analysts tended to view guerrilla warfare as merely an adjunct to conventional war or as part of a national uprising against a foreign invasion.

Clausewitz, for example, thought of guerrilla warfare as an auxiliary to regular military forces in the context of resisting an invading army. Irregulars, in his view, should not be employed against any sizeable enemy force. Their aim is not to "pulverise the core but to nibble at the shell and around the edges." They should be used outside the theatre of war, in order to deny the invader these areas. Clausewitz pictured partisans as "nebulous and elusive," whose resistance "should never materialise as a concrete body." Otherwise, an adequate regular force would be able to easily crush them. To be effective, insurgent forces must concentrate at points along the flanks of the enemy's theatre of operations, "where he is vulnerable to its strongest blows."[6]

Jomini too located guerrilla warfare within the matrix of national uprisings against an invading army. In his view, the difficulties of an invading force were particularly great when the popular uprising is "supported by a nucleus of disciplined troops." Without the support of a disciplined and regular army, popular uprisings would always be eventually suppressed. The invader would be unable to hold any ground "but that upon which he encamps..." Compared to the guerrillas who know the smallest paths and are aided by the people at large, the invader is like a blind man. And like

Don Quixote, the invader goes about attacking a non-existent enemy, even as the guerrilla force cuts his,

> line of communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a time.[7]

Even the socialist pioneers, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, saw guerrilla operations only as an adjunct to conventional warfare. Reviewing the past, Marx noted that guerrilla bands were most successful while they remained small. Once they began aping a regular army, they were frequently defeated. Engels, on his part, concluded that guerrilla warfare did not have much of a future. Given the modern military system of skirmishes along an extended line, behind which stood support groups and reserves, as well as the tactics of concentrating troops against a common target, guerrillas faced certain defeat. The only condition in which even large armies will not be able to make rapid progress is when popular resistance has been awakened. Even then, guerrilla war can succeed only in conjunction with the operations of regular forces.[8]

An Aspect of Small Wars

While the 'long peace' established itself over Europe in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna (1815), major European powers set about parcelling out among themselves vast areas in Asia and Africa.[9] Given the superiority of European arms, any resistance against colonial conquest had to necessarily adopt irregular tactics. Experience in some of these campaigns led a young British artillery officer, Captain Charles Callwell, to write an essay on what he termed 'Small Wars'.[10] Small Wars, Callwell wrote, included,

> all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers … [and] campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organised armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field...[11]

The term, however, had no particular connection with the scale on which campaigns were conducted, but simply denoted operations of regular, meaning European armies against irregular, or comparatively irregular, forces.

The concept of Small Wars thus included campaigns as varied as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the suppression of the 1857 Indian Mutiny, the desultory war waged by US troops against nomadic Red Indians, the 1859 Spanish invasion of Morocco and the British pacification of Burma. Callwell divided Small Wars into

three broad categories: campaigns of conquest or annexation; campaigns for the suppression of insurrections and lawlessness or for the pacification of conquered or annexed territory; and campaigns undertaken "to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy." [12]

Irregular or guerrilla operations were an essential part of all these campaigns. Campaigns of conquest or annexation, in Callwell's view, invariably passed through two stages. In the first stage, European regular forces militarily crush the armies and imposed levies that local rulers or chieftains mobilised. Once organised resistance ceases, the losing side invariably mounted irregular operations. The second category of Small Wars—subjugation of insurrections and pacification of conquered territory—necessarily involved dealing with guerrillas and irregulars. Small wars of the third category—to punish an offending state or to wipe out a dangerous enemy—frequently developed into campaigns of conquest, which again raised the spectre of guerrilla operations by the losing side. [13]

Guerrilla Warfare as an Exact Science!

The next landmark in the conceptual evolution was T. E. Lawrence's articulation that some factors, if pursued along certain lines, guerrilla warfare could be proved an exact science. [14] The factors that Lawrence had in mind were: an unassailable guerrilla base, a regular opposing army of limited strength with the task of controlling a wide area and a sympathetic population. What the guerrillas themselves needed in these circumstances were speed and endurance, independent lines of supply as well as technical equipment to paralyse the opponent's lines of communications. "Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents..." [15]

His very first contact with the rebels convinced Lawrence that they were not suitable for a European-style military drill and, hence, for organisation into regular units. Consequently, he envisaged a war of "dervishes against regular troops." Given the absence of organised forces and, therefore, the capacity to destroy the Turkish Army in battle, the actual Arab goal must be "geographical, to extrude the Turk from all Arabic-speaking lands in Asia." The way to achieve this was for the Arab irregulars to become "an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas." [16]

Lawrence's analysis proceeded thus. The Turks would need about 600,000 troops to retain control of the Arabian Peninsula. But since they had only 100,000, they were bound to fail. Besides, war *matériel* was at a premium on the Turkish side. The cue, therefore, was to destroy these material resources. "The death of a Turkish

bridge or rail, machine or gun or charge of high explosive," in his view, "was more profitable … than the death of a Turk."[17] The Turkish army *per se* was not a target, but its line of communications was. To accomplish this aim, what the Arabs needed was "a highly mobile, highly equipped type of force." For, "range is more to strategy than force" and the smallest force must be used to reach the farthest place in the quickest time. Battles were not necessary because a superior force imposes them on its inferior adversary. Hence, the Arabs were to "defend nothing and to shoot nothing."[18]

Lawrence's conceptualisation also moved away from the notion of guerrilla warfare as a purely military phenomenon and laid far more stress on the political dimensions of such conflicts. Only a third of guerrilla warfare, in his view, was a military problem. And the nature of even this 'technical' aspect "depended fundamentally on the political two-thirds."[19]

A Component of Revolution

Insurrection was central to nineteenth-century revolutionary doctrine. Though its technique was not fully fleshed out at that time, advocates of 'Revolution' made important contributions in this regard. Chief among them were Italian and Polish radicals, who discussed the guerrilla warfare doctrine in the context of the most effective politico-military approach to attain national liberation and unification.

The Italian radical Carlo Bianco was the first to establish a link between guerrilla warfare and radical politics (1828-29). His analysis began with the assumption that Italy cannot be liberated through a modern war. For, the insurgents would not be able to collect money, obtain the necessary weapons, and mobilise large armies that were needed for the purpose. In contrast, it would be quite easy for them to mobilise two million Italians for a people's war. Guerrilla units, in his view, should comprise only between ten and fifty rebels in the early stages of the struggle. Any larger force would be vulnerable to enemy military action and infiltration. Sustained guerrilla warfare would develop, over time, into a true people's war involving all sections of society. In the later stages of the war, flying columns and eventually a regular army would be formed. Since the aim was not just limited to independence but also included the constitution of Italy as a 'republic', he foresaw a transitional period of revolutionary terror and the purge or even extermination of all internal enemies in liberated areas.

Some of these views were reflected, and even improved upon, in other works. In Mazzini's view, guerrillas were the precursors of the nation, which they would "rouse to insurrection." General Guglielmo Pepe insisted on the necessity of establishing 'liberated zones' during the early stages of the conflict itself. Enrico Gentilini regarded guerrilla warfare, which would be protracted in nature, as a prelude to people's war.

Thus, many of the ideas of the twentieth century guerrilla warfare can be found in these writings. This was also true of Polish writings in this period. But, after the Europe-wide insurrections of 1848 were crushed, revolutionary writers tended to de-emphasise the guerrilla aspect in future struggles.[20]

When the 'Revolution' finally succeeded in Russia in 1917, guerrilla warfare did not play a significant role. But Lenin's pre-Revolution writings did envisage a protracted struggle organised under the strict control of the Communist Party. Combat, in his view, would assume numerous forms: selective terror through assassinations, confiscation of money from both government and private persons as well as demonstrations, strikes and street fighting. Guerrilla warfare is "an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur between the 'big engagements' in the civil war." But guerrilla warfare is not the only or even the chief method of the struggle. It must be subordinated to other methods and "be ennobled by the enlightening and organising influence of socialism."[21]

Mao tse-Tung and People's War

Mao's ideas on Revolution rested on three essential principles: the decisive role of military forces; the importance of rural base areas; and the protracted character of the struggle.[22] Guerrilla warfare was an important element in Mao's scheme which is employed by a nation inferior in arms and equipment. But it is only one aspect of the revolutionary struggle and by itself cannot achieve total success. It is not an end in itself and, therefore, cannot be divorced from the operations of regular forces. While guerrilla operations may temporarily become 'paramount' in the whole context of the war, regular forces are 'of primary importance.' For, only the latter are capable of 'producing the decision.' Guerrilla warfare can, of course, assist regular forces in producing this favourable decision. Thus, while it must be promoted as "a necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations," guerrilla warfare must not be assigned the primary position in the overall military strategy. Nor must it be substituted for "mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox forces." But Mao laced his analysis with the caveat that under specific conditions, guerrilla warfare can "develop and assume orthodox characteristics."[23]

Guerrilla warfare in the Maoist conceptualisation was only one in a series of merging phases of the revolutionary struggle. Phase one was the preparatory stage, when regional bases are organised and consolidated.[24] Guerrilla attacks, limited to small actions in the first phase, were stepped up in the next. At the same time, political activities were expanded to peripheral districts to absorb them within the 'liberated' zone. Phase three was the decisive stage when the enemy is destroyed through orthodox military operations. A significant percentage of the guerrilla force must be transformed

into a regular army at this stage. Though guerrilla operations were not altogether precluded at this stage, they would play only a subsidiary role.[25]

Guerrilla operations must flow from a clearly defined political goal, which, in turn, must coincide with the aspirations of the people. If people's support and assistance are not gained, guerrilla warfare will fail. Guerrilla warfare also cannot contribute to victory if it is unorganised.[26] The importance of the political factor led Mao to articulate the concept of the three unities, namely, political activities as applied first to the troops, next to the people, and lastly to the enemy. What these got translated into were three fundamental actions: 'spiritual unification' of officers and men within the Red Army, 'spiritual unification' of the Red Army and the people, and 'destruction of the unity of the enemy.'

The first of these could be achieved by ensuring that officers and common soldiers lived and fought under the same conditions. Bringing about 'spiritual unification' of the Communist Army and the people is essentially a question of convincing the populace to identify itself with the revolutionary forces. For this purpose, Mao laid down detailed rules on troop behaviour towards the people. It is in this context that he likened people to water and guerrillas to 'the fish who inhabit it'. The third unity was to be attained by 'propagandising' enemy troops and by treating captured enemy soldiers with consideration. Failure in this regard would only strengthen the enemy's solidarity.[27]

To organise the Revolution, Mao advocated dividing and sub-dividing the country into 'military areas' and districts, each with its own complement of military commanders and political commissioners. The populace in each area was to be armed and organised into two groups: a combat group and a self-defence group. Combatants would form guerrilla squads, platoons or companies, under the direct supervision of the military commander. Non-combatants of both sexes made up the self-defence groups or units. Their duties included: sentry duties, securing intelligence, policing, hindering enemy counter-guerrilla actions, carrying the wounded in action, and carrying food for the guerrillas. Mao, thus, sought to involve the whole population in the revolutionary struggle, spearheaded through guerrilla operations. Popular support was, after all, not only necessary for the success of the struggle but also determined the nature of guerrilla operations. The essential features of guerrilla warfare were surprise, alertness, mobility and tactical offensive which required careful planning. And good planning depends on superior intelligence which can be gained only from the people.[28]

The military responsibilities of guerrillas included: extermination of small enemy forces and harassment and weakening of larger forces; attacking enemy lines of

communications; establishing bases that can support independent operations in the enemy's rear; forcing the enemy to disperse its strength; and coordinating all these activities with those of the regular armies. Tactics that guerrillas were asked to use for this purpose were:

> seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.[29]

The rear flanks and any other vulnerable points were the opponent's vital spots. Guerrillas must focus their attacks on these points so as to harass, attack, disperse, exhaust and finally annihilate enemy forces. This is the only way in which guerrillas can carry out "their mission of independent ... action and co-ordination with the effort of the regular armies."[30]

The Vietnamese and Latin American Variations

The guerrilla tactics used by the Vietnamese communists were broadly fashioned after the Chinese pattern. Like Mao, Ho Chi Minh too circulated strict do's and don'ts to revolutionary soldiers and administrators.[31] The first Vietnamese leader to provide a systematic outline of a guerrilla doctrine was Truong Chih who essentially repeated most of what Mao had already stated.[32] But it was Vo Nguyen Giap who built upon Mao's ideas. He generally accepted Mao's doctrine of people's war, with its three phases, namely, the importance of base areas, the need to transform the guerrilla force into a regular army, etc.[33]

Giap's innovation pertains to the transition between the second and third stages of the people's war. He insisted upon three pre-conditions before entering the last stage. These were: superiority of revolutionary forces, a favourable world situation, and a noticeable weakening of the enemy's resolve. In a further modification, he further divided the final stage into four distinct sub-stages. The first of these involved gaining total popular support in order to establish absolute moral superiority over the enemy forces. As a second step, the revolutionary armies were to be modernised so as to be able to take on the opposing forces. Next, international developments that tend to weaken the enemy must be exploited to strengthen the insurgency. And the last step involved gaining greater momentum in the pursuit of the insurgency.[34]

Put forth by Che Guevara and Régis Debray, the Latin American variation of the guerrilla warfare theory turned the Marxist-Maoist formulation of the political party driving the military forces on its head. In this articulation, it was not the political vanguard that would create the popular army, but the guerrilla force itself could be a

revolutionary fusion of political and military authority. The guerrillas could act as a revolutionary 'vanguard' party in a nascent form. And contrary to Mao's formulation, they assumed that a prolonged period for carefully preparing the population was not necessary and that a minimum level of popular discontent with a government was sufficient to create a revolutionary situation.[35] In fact, a fundamental lesson that Guevara drew from the Cuban Revolution was that an insurrection in itself could create the necessary conditions for a Revolution.[36] Such an insurrection should be organised by a relatively small group of guerrillas—the *foco* (focus). The government's inability to eliminate the highly mobile guerrillas would force it into over-reaction against the population. The *foco* would thus act as a catalyst for the wider popular insurrection that would flow from government repression.[37] But from this point onwards, he agreed with Mao's articulation that guerrilla warfare is the initial phase of the revolutionary struggle and that only regular forces can annihilate the enemy; and with the three stages of guerrilla warfare.[38]

Urban Guerrilla Warfare and Latin America

Urban guerrilla warfare emerged as an alternative strategy among Latin American revolutionaries in the late 1960s after rural guerrilla operations failed to bring about Revolutions in the continent. Many advocates of urban guerrilla operations, like Guillermo Lora, the Bolivian Trotskyite leader, for instance, felt that guerrillas were essentially an alien body in the countryside. When guerrillas spoke to the rural populace, they could not be sure whether the latter were ridiculing them. For, they were largely city-bred people with middle or upper class origins who had difficulty in adapting to the hard life of the countryside and in identifying themselves with the peasants. Guevara went so far as to write that the peasants "were impenetrable like stones."[39]

Advocates of urban guerrilla warfare pointed out that, given the fast pace of urbanisation in Latin America, the idea of the countryside 'encircling' the cities was outdated.[40] Since the centre of economic, military and political power has increasingly come to lie in the cities, attacks should be concentrated on urban targets to attain revolutionary success. But this did not mean that they completely rejected operations in the countryside. Urban operations were envisaged either as the first stage of an insurrectionary movement or as part of a pincer movement carried out in coordination with operations in the countryside. A significant feature of their articulations was the view that the deed was more important than the thought and that 'action' counted for more than consistent strategy or a clear political purpose. In the words of one advocate, ".... the urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic action in which he acts and survives, is to shoot."[41] Later, in the wake of the failure of this strategy, Fidel Castro was to argue that the city was 'the graveyard' of the revolutionary.[42]

It was felt that several advantages lay in adopting an urban strategy. Slums as well as upper-class neighbourhoods offered excellent cover. It is far easier to obtain money and weapons as well as information about targets. Moreover, urban operations –attacks on banks and stores, assassination of political leaders, and kidnapping of businessmen and foreigners – generated greater media publicity. At the same time, urban guerrillas were also plagued by severe constraints. Newsworthiness, and thus publicity, reduced with repetition. The arrest of even a single guerrilla led the security forces to the entire group along with its arsenal and headquarters. To reduce the risk of discovery, they had to be small in number; but the political impact of a small anonymous group proved to be insignificant.[43]

Abraham Guillén was one of the first to advocate urban guerrilla warfare.[44] He viewed it as "a struggle between capitalism and socialism with its epicentre in the great cities."[45] Though he did not exclude rural guerrilla operations, he maintained that in highly urbanised countries like Uruguay and Argentina, revolutionary battles ought to be waged in urban areas. For, ".... the revolutionary potential is where the population is." In his view, the support of 80 per cent of the population was necessary for success. He was also one of the few Latin American guerrilla strategists to advocate a leading role for students in the revolutionary process.[46]

Basing his analysis on the experience of the Tupamaros in Uruguay, Guillén stipulated that urban guerrillas should lead a clandestine existence with the support of the populace; but failed to clarify how this contradiction between clandestine existence and mass support might be overcome in actual practice. He viewed mobility and security as the two prerequisites of guerrilla strategy. To ensure these, guerrillas should not establish fixed urban bases. They should live in small, separate, groups but fight together. Light arms, supplemented by machine guns and bazookas, were to be their weapons. Guerrilla tactics should concentrate on small, successive actions instead of attempting to seize large objectives. Faced with a hundred guerrilla cells of five persons each, the police would have no choice but to cede terrain to the guerrillas, especially at night. But ultimately, the struggle would be won by whoever— guerrillas or security forces—endures the longest. Guillén opposed unnecessary violence because a popular army has to be a symbol of justice, equality, liberty and security to win popular support for the revolutionary struggle. For, "[E]ven more than conventional war, revolutionary war is a form of politics carried out by violent means."[47]

The theory of urban guerrilla warfare found its most developed expression in the writings of Carlos Marighela. Author of the *Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (also known as the *Minimanual*), he favoured armed struggle to bring about the Revolution. In his view, the 'armed propaganda' carried out by guerrillas would

undermine governmental authority. And, the latter's consequent over-reaction and repression would alienate the population from the government. Though similar to Guevara's articulations, there was one difference in Marighela's views: his emphasis was on urban operations.

Urban centres, in his view, not only offered soft targets but also safe havens in a teeming population. Strikes on urban targets also guaranteed greater publicity; a vital component for the promotion of the guerrilla cause. At the same time, he did not rule out rural operations altogether. In fact, he regarded the city as a tactical arena and the countryside as the strategic arena. Revolutionary success, in his view, would flow from a combination of urban and rural operations. The urban campaign, however, was the starting point. It would, over time, expand and extend into the countryside where the critical confrontation between the ruling authorities and the people's army would ultimately take place.[48] But, according to one authority, Marighela's views on strategy were inconsistent in that he alternately stressed on the strategic importance of urban operations and those carried out in the countryside.[49]

Marighela argued that urban guerrilla operations must be carried out by a small elite group of dedicated revolutionaries organised in cells. The basic unit of an urban guerrilla army was the 'firing group,' constituted by no more than four or five persons. Two such groups operating separately would form a 'firing team'. He was in favour of granting freedom of action and decision to these units and was averse to the idea of a bureaucratic hierarchy or a complex chain of command. A strategic command with regional coordination groups would suffice to direct the operations. He laid stress on training and on the need among urban guerrillas for personal qualities like initiative, patience and fortitude in the face of adversity.[50]

A New Conceptualisation for the 21st Century?

An important feature of guerrilla warfare infused with revolutionary principles, was the involvement of citizens of other countries in what were essentially national struggles. Che Guevara was a prominent figure during the Cold War who was born an Argentinian but played a significant role in the Cuban Revolution and, subsequently, died while attempting to bring about a communist revolution in Bolivia. This phenomenon reached its zenith during the *jihad* that the United States helped to foster against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan which saw the incongruous assembly of religious-minded Muslim youth from across the world. The consequences of incongruity came home to the United States in the form of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. But many other countries—from Russia to India and from Algeria to the Philippines—have also had to bear the fallout wafted from the Afghan battlefield.

With the recent turn of the United States towards an 'imperial' policy, one can foresee the re-emergence of classical guerrilla warfare as a means employed by less powerful countries when faced with actual or planned US military intervention. This phenomenon was on display, albeit in a modest manner, during the recently concluded 'Operation Iraqi Freedom'. From the perspective of the United States, of course, these could be termed as Small Wars, a phenomenon Britain and other imperial powers had to grapple with earlier in the decades before the First World War. US success or failure in other potential target countries would determine whether history is written from the perspective of Small Wars or from that of a born-again guerrilla movement.

Acknowledgements

References/End Notes

1. 'Guerrilla' means little war. It is derived from *guerrilleros*, which referred to Spanish and Portuguese irregulars operating against French occupation armies (1808-14).

2. Huntington, Samuel P., Introduction. *In* Franklin M. Osanka, *Ed*. Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. 1962. The Free Press; New York. p. xvi. [Emphasis in original].

3. Cited in Andrew Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. *World Politics*. January 1975, 27 (2). pp. 184-85.

4. For example, the budget of the FLN (*Front de la Libération Nationale*) rebels in Algeria was about US $30 to 40 million a year, which amount the French spent in less than two weeks. Cited in Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study. 1986 edn. Transaction Publishers; New Brunswick/London. p. 379.

5. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. *International Security*. Summer 2001, 26 (1) 103.

6. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 1984. Princeton University Press; Princeton, New Jersey. pp. 480-82.

7. Asprey, Robert B.,War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. 1975. Macdonald and Jane's; London. p. 164; citing from Jomini's classic work *Précis de l'art de la guerre* [The Art of War].

8. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, pp. 142-45.

9. For the sake of coherence, this subsection and the following one on T. E. Lawrence have been placed before the articulations of nineteenth century European revolutionaries. Evolution, it should be borne in mind here, is anyway not a linear progression.

10. It generated so much comment that he expanded it over the course of the next eleven years into a book.

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12. Ibid. pp. 21-25.

13. Ibid. pp. 25-28.

14. T. E. Lawrence, a British intelligence officer serving in the Middle-East during the First World War, co-ordinated the operations of the Arab rebellion against Turkish rule. After the Arab Revolt broke out in June 1916, he was despatched to establish contact with the leaders of the movement. He was subsequently appointed Adviser and Liaison Officer to Prince Feisal, whom Lawrence identified as the right leader for the movement. See his Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. 1994 Indian edn. Natraj Publishers; Dehradun.

15. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4. p. 169; citing from Lawrence's essay on guerrilla warfare in the 1957 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

16. Lawrence, T.E., no. 14, pp. 104, 191-92.

17. Ibid. pp.192-94.

18. Asprey, Robert B., no. 7. pp. 287-88, 290; citing Lawrence's essay on guerrilla warfare in Encyclopaedia Britannica.

19. Baylis, John, Revolutionary Warfare. *In* John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies. 1975. Croom Helm; London. p. 133.

20. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, pp. 130-37.

21. Lenin, V. I., Guerrilla Warfare. *In* Walter Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology. 1978. Wildwood House; London. pp. 172-78.

22. Asprey, Robert B., no. 7. pp. 386-87.

23. Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare. Trans. and Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. 1961. Cassell; London. pp. 31-32, 41-42.

24. Mao, in one of his earthy metaphors, used to compare, according to one of his soldiers, the need for a base area with an individual's need for buttocks. "If an individual didn't have buttocks, he ... would have to run around or stand around all the time. ... His legs would get tired and collapse under him, and he would fall down." Cited in Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present. 1977. The Free Press; New York. p. 4.

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26. Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, no. 23. pp. 32-34.

27. Ibid. pp. 65-67.

28. Ibid. pp. 56-58, 75.

29. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

30. Ibid. p. 39.

31. Asprey, Robert B., no. 7. pp. 754-55.

32. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4. p. 267.

33. Giap, General Vo Nguyen, Banner of People's War, the Party's Military Line. 1970. Praeger Publishers; New York. pp. 42-55, 65-69, 82-94.

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35. Beckett, Ian F. W., Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents Since 1750. 2001. Routledge; London. p. 170.

36. Guevara, Che, Guerrilla Warfare. 1961. Monthly Review Press; New York. p. 15.
37. Beckett, Ian F. W., no. 35, p. 170.
38. Guevara, Che, no. 36, p. 20; also see Strategy for Conquest: Communist Documents on Guerrilla Warfare. *Ed*. and Introduction by Jay Mallin. 1970. University of Miami Press; Coral Gables, Florida. p. 278.
39. Cited in Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, p. 343.
40. By 1967, at least 50 per cent of the population of every Latin American state, with the exception of Peru, was urbanized. Beckett, Ian F. W., no. 35, p. 174.
41. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, pp. 317, 322, 324, 347.
42. Cited in Ian F.W. Beckett, no. 35, p. 151.
43. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, pp. 320, 323.
44. A Spaniard who had taken part in the Spanish Civil War, Guillén had settled down in Uruguay after spending a few years in Argentina. He partly provided the inspiration for the Uruguayan rebel movement, the Tupamaros. Ian F.W. Beckett, no. 35, p. 177.
45. Guillén, Abraham, Urban Guerrilla Strategy. *In* Gérard Chaliand, *Ed*. Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. 1982. University of California Press; Berkeley, California. p. 317.
46. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, p. 345.
47. Guillén, Abraham, no. 45, pp. 317-22; Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, pp. 344, 346.
48. Beckett, Ian F.W., no. 35, p. 175.
49. Laqueur, Walter, no. 4, p. 347.
50. Ibid, p. 348.

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