India had all of two weeks to achieve the politico-military end state of liberating Bangladesh, before the international community intervened to impose a ceasefire. Speed and tempo of operations were imperative.Indian Armed Forces exploited the special operations capabilities to ensure an early fall of Dhaka. The airborne assault at Tangail, the audacious helilift of troops across the mighty Meghna by General Sagat Singh with effective support from the Mukti Bahini contributed to the early fall of Dhaka with most defences still intact.

As the bulk of India’s foreign trade transits through sea, it turns sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean strategically important for India. The newly independent India did not pay adequate attention to this factor. Consequently, within two decades of independence continuous flow of unprotected large volume of India’s sea trade had become a strategic target for its adversaries. In this context, during the 1971 India–Pakistan war, India efficiently protected its vital sea lanes, ensuring that goods and commodities continued to reach Indian ports.

The ISPR was founded in 1949 as the public relations wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces. However, its role, responsibilities and activities have expanded notably over the last three decades. This article evaluates the role of the ISPR in cyber propaganda via print and electronic media after 1990s. It also sheds light on the ISPR’s youth-internship scheme and its plausible role in digital espionage. The main arguments in this article are derived from information available on official websites of Pakistan military, their local newspapers, and relevant social media platforms.