Links between Nepalese Maoists and Indian Maoists started in 1995 and have grown subsequently. During the initial stages of their collaboration, the Nepalese Maoists sought strategic and material support from their Indian counterparts. Later, differences emerged over the introduction of 'prachandapath'. However, links continued at the ideological level, confined to debate and discussions on the nature of revolution and State.
In a meticulously planned offensive, reminiscent of the February 2004 attack at Koraput in Orissa, around 360 highly trained armed cadres belonging to the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) also known as Naxalites, including women cadres, carried out simultaneous attack on district armory, police training school armory, and the police stations of Nayagarh town, Nuagoan, Dasapalla and the Mahipur police outpost in Nayagarh district in Orissa. Nearly 15 police personnel including a civilian were killed and 5 others injured in the attack.
King Gyanendra's takeover of absolute political power in February 2005 paved the way for the Maoists of Nepal and the political parties to fight together for democracy. In signing the 12-point agreement with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), the Maoists even changed their strategy from a revolutionary agenda to a democratic one. The paper argues that the Maoist departure from the classical resistance model to the path of negotiation was tactical, to overcome the constraints on their way forward.
In response to the government-organised National Naxalite Co-ordination Committee meeting held in December 2006 at Bhubaneswar, Naxalites have enunciated their counter-strategy. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), which accounts for 98 per cent of left-wing extremist violence in India, decided to intensify the people's war by increasing its mass base across the country and strengthening its armed cadres. The decision, taken at a leadership conclave held somewhere in the forests along the Jharkand-Orissa border sometime in January or February 2007, was unanimous.
Despite the Chhattisgarh government's two-pronged strategy of police operation combined with socio economic programmes against the Naxalites, there appears to be deterioration in the law and order situation in the state due to the escalation of Naxal violence. Frequent use of police forces against tribals in the name of anti-Naxal operations, forceful eviction due to mining and the establishment of industries by the state machinery have left the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh a virtual battle zone.
Despite the cease-fire, the Nepalese Maoists are busy collecting illegal taxes, besides carrying out abductions, extortion and forceful recruitment. They are consolidating their bases in urban areas where they had a very poor presence till April 2006, and are recruiting new cadres with the objective of setting up a communist society, if the peace talks fail. In the last four months, the strength of the Maoist armed cadres has increased from 29,000 to 35,000. While the Nepal Army is confined to its barracks, the Maoists are reportedly carrying their arms and moving freely.
Despite the King's proclamation and the subsequent end to the 19-day anti-Monarchy protests by the seven party alliance (SPA) on April 25, 2006, Nepal is still not sure of peace and stability. The difference between the SPA and the Maoists on the new constitution seems to be the biggest challenge before the Koirala Government. Although the Maoists have declared a three-month ceasefire, they have refused to surrender their weapons before or during the elections to a Constituent Assembly.
Maoists in Nepal and India: Tactical Alliances and Ideological Differences
Links between Nepalese Maoists and Indian Maoists started in 1995 and have grown subsequently. During the initial stages of their collaboration, the Nepalese Maoists sought strategic and material support from their Indian counterparts. Later, differences emerged over the introduction of 'prachandapath'. However, links continued at the ideological level, confined to debate and discussions on the nature of revolution and State.
Naxalite Mayhem in Nayagarh
In a meticulously planned offensive, reminiscent of the February 2004 attack at Koraput in Orissa, around 360 highly trained armed cadres belonging to the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) also known as Naxalites, including women cadres, carried out simultaneous attack on district armory, police training school armory, and the police stations of Nayagarh town, Nuagoan, Dasapalla and the Mahipur police outpost in Nayagarh district in Orissa. Nearly 15 police personnel including a civilian were killed and 5 others injured in the attack.
Engagements of Extra Regional Powers in Nepal since 1990s: Implications for India
Discussants: Ashok Mehta & K.V. Rajan
The Maoist Movement in Nepal and Its Tactical Digressions: A Study of Strategic Revolutionary Phases, and Future Implications
King Gyanendra's takeover of absolute political power in February 2005 paved the way for the Maoists of Nepal and the political parties to fight together for democracy. In signing the 12-point agreement with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), the Maoists even changed their strategy from a revolutionary agenda to a democratic one. The paper argues that the Maoist departure from the classical resistance model to the path of negotiation was tactical, to overcome the constraints on their way forward.
Maoists in Nepal and India: A Study on Linkages
Discussant: Ashok Mehta
Naxalites resolve to focus on urban areas
In response to the government-organised National Naxalite Co-ordination Committee meeting held in December 2006 at Bhubaneswar, Naxalites have enunciated their counter-strategy. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), which accounts for 98 per cent of left-wing extremist violence in India, decided to intensify the people's war by increasing its mass base across the country and strengthening its armed cadres. The decision, taken at a leadership conclave held somewhere in the forests along the Jharkand-Orissa border sometime in January or February 2007, was unanimous.
Naxalism in Chhattisgarh: Down, not wiped out
Despite the Chhattisgarh government's two-pronged strategy of police operation combined with socio economic programmes against the Naxalites, there appears to be deterioration in the law and order situation in the state due to the escalation of Naxal violence. Frequent use of police forces against tribals in the name of anti-Naxal operations, forceful eviction due to mining and the establishment of industries by the state machinery have left the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh a virtual battle zone.
Maoist's Strategic Revolutionary Phases: A Study on Nepal
Discussants: Arvind Deo & Arun Sahgal
Nepal's Ceasefire Under Stress
Despite the cease-fire, the Nepalese Maoists are busy collecting illegal taxes, besides carrying out abductions, extortion and forceful recruitment. They are consolidating their bases in urban areas where they had a very poor presence till April 2006, and are recruiting new cadres with the objective of setting up a communist society, if the peace talks fail. In the last four months, the strength of the Maoist armed cadres has increased from 29,000 to 35,000. While the Nepal Army is confined to its barracks, the Maoists are reportedly carrying their arms and moving freely.
Democracy Versus People's War in Nepal
Despite the King's proclamation and the subsequent end to the 19-day anti-Monarchy protests by the seven party alliance (SPA) on April 25, 2006, Nepal is still not sure of peace and stability. The difference between the SPA and the Maoists on the new constitution seems to be the biggest challenge before the Koirala Government. Although the Maoists have declared a three-month ceasefire, they have refused to surrender their weapons before or during the elections to a Constituent Assembly.