The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.
Rebels of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) have been repeatedly targeting infrastructure, which are soft targets. The targets of their attacks include telecommunication towers, Railways and power transmission centres and lines, to name a few.
A little before dawn on December 12, 2007, Naxalites of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) blew up railway track at two different places in Bihar – the first one near Bhalui halt station on Jhajha-Kiul section of East Central Railway, disrupting train services on the Patna-Howrah main line and the other on the single line between Kajra and Urain stations on Kiul-Jamalpur section of Eastern Railway.
The Maoists continue to advance their violent campaign to capture political power through armed revolution. In the current year, till October 31, 571 lives have been lost in Maoist violence. Another 12, including two civilians and 10 personnel of the Mizo Battalion, were killed in an ambush on November 29 near Konta in Chhattisgarh. Correspondingly, the state response has been inadequate in containing the Maoists’ campaign and their influence. Strikingly various authorities continue to hold a widely divergent perception of the spatial spread of the Maoist movement.
A Critical Evaluation of the Union Government's Response to the Maoist Challenge
The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.
Maoists' Tactical United Front (TUF) and Urban Movement
Chair: A K Doval
Discussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi
Maoists’ Attacks on Infrastructure
Rebels of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) have been repeatedly targeting infrastructure, which are soft targets. The targets of their attacks include telecommunication towers, Railways and power transmission centres and lines, to name a few.
A Critical Evaluation of Andhra Pradesh’s Response to the Naxal Challenge
Chair: G. D Bakshi
Discussants: D. K. Karthikeyan and J. N. Roy
A Critical Evaluation of Union Government Response to Maoist Challenge
Chair: Ved Marwah
Discussant: Prakash Singh
Railway a Soft Target for Maoists
A little before dawn on December 12, 2007, Naxalites of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) blew up railway track at two different places in Bihar – the first one near Bhalui halt station on Jhajha-Kiul section of East Central Railway, disrupting train services on the Patna-Howrah main line and the other on the single line between Kajra and Urain stations on Kiul-Jamalpur section of Eastern Railway.
Unabated Maoist Violence: Ignoring Is Not Bliss
The Maoists continue to advance their violent campaign to capture political power through armed revolution. In the current year, till October 31, 571 lives have been lost in Maoist violence. Another 12, including two civilians and 10 personnel of the Mizo Battalion, were killed in an ambush on November 29 near Konta in Chhattisgarh. Correspondingly, the state response has been inadequate in containing the Maoists’ campaign and their influence. Strikingly various authorities continue to hold a widely divergent perception of the spatial spread of the Maoist movement.