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One Year of Operation 1027: Myanmar at a Critical Juncture

Om Prakash Das
Mr Om Prakash Das is Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Click here for detailed profile.

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    Om Prakash Das
    November 06, 2024

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    Introduction

    On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military staged a coup, rejecting the 2020 election results and assuming control of the government, citing election fraud. The coup sparked widespread protests, civil disobedience and armed resistance. Despite international condemnation, the military has maintained power, suspending democratic elections and declaring a state of emergency. A September 2024 UN report states that 5,350 civilians have been killed by the military since the coup.1

    Myanmar is one of Southeast Asia's most ethnically diverse countries, home to over 135 recognised ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities such as the Shan, Kachin, Karen, Chin, Mon and Rakhine reside in the seven states, each named after its largest ethnic group.2 These minorities constitute 40 to 60 per cent of the population and occupy nearly half of the country’s territory.3 Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1948, the country has faced persistent insurgencies from ethnic groups seeking autonomy or independence due to grievances over political marginalisation, economic inequality and cultural suppression.4

    The presence of powerful non-state armed groups in border regions exacerbates the instability, while the government’s refusal to embrace democratic processes further fuels the conflict.5 In June 2019, three armed groups—the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—formed an alliance called ‘The Three Brotherhood Alliance’.6 The alliance rose to prominence in 2023 in resisting the Burmese junta following the 2021 Myanmar coup d'état. On 27 October 2023, the alliance launched Operation 1027, an offensive against the junta in northern Shan state, bordering China, Laos and Thailand.

    By early November, the Brotherhood Alliance announced significant territorial advances, asserting control over more than 100 military bases and several towns. The conflict intensified further in November, extending into both Sagaing, a north-western administrative region, and Rakhine State, located on Myanmar's western coast along the Bay of Bengal and bordering Bangladesh. By January 2024, MNDAA captured Laukkai (Shan State), resulting in the surrender of 2,389 Tatmadaw soldiers. Mid-January 2024 saw additional gains by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which captured Mabein (Shan State) and secured a crucial Tatmadaw base. In June, the conflict escalated with the capture of strategic towns, including Kyaukme in northern Shan State. By July, coordinated assaults by the MNDAA and TNLA yielded further victories, most notably the seizure of Mogok and Lashio (junta’s Northeastern Command base). The alliance and other ‘resistance forces’ have now control over 60 per cent of the country.7

    Along with major strategic areas of Shan State, resistance forces control parts of northern Rakhine, Chin, Karen, Karenni, Sagaing and Magway, while in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army has captured numerous military positions. Active battles are ongoing in the Mandalay region, particularly around Mandalay city itself, as well as in key towns in northern Shan State. Resistance offensives are advancing into central Myanmar, solidifying their approach towards Mandalay and challenging the junta’s hold on power.

    Military setbacks have led to low morale in the Tatmadaw, weakened unit cohesion and increased desertions. The junta's forces have weakened, with troop numbers dropping to 130,000 and auxiliary forces to 70,000.8 Reports note of “unprecedented levels of defection” (numbering nearly 6,000), desertions (a conservative estimate is 15,000).9 While the military's state-run publication, The Global New Light of Myanmar, typically avoids direct acknowledgment of military setbacks, a shift in tone is evident as the military grapples with operational challenges, rising instability and infrastructure attacks across the country. The paper in June 2024 acknowledged that ‘certain states and regions have restricted access due to the presence of anti-government forces’.10 In August 2024, one report noted that senior officers ‘comforted Tatmadaw members and Myanmar Police Force (MPF) members receiving medical treatments for their injuries suffered while serving the defence and security duties of the State’.11 Another article flagged ‘attempts to deteriorate peace and stability in the area of Southern Command’, including blowing up of communication routes, bridges and railways and highlighted efforts of Tatmadaw and MPF in taking measures for ‘ensuring peace and stability of the region’.12

    While the Tatmadaw accuses the insurgent groups of using civilians as ‘human shields’,13 rebel forces, pro-democratic groups and international groups such as Amnesty International note that there is increasing reliance on airstrikes and targeting of civilians in conflict zones in the military’s counteroffensive. An investigation by Amnesty International into Myanmar’s military airstrikes on 7 January 2024 revealed the tragic deaths of 17 civilians, including nine children, during an attack near Saint Peter Baptist Church in Kanan village, Sagaing region.14 Despite the Myanmar military denying involvement, evidence—including satellite imagery, witness testimonies and videos—indicates the use of A-5 fighter jets during the attack. According to a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the frequency of airstrikes in Myanmar increased by over 300 per cent from 2021 to 2023.15

    By early 2024, given that the rebel groups had seized key border crossings in Shan State and captured strategic military positions in Chin State, the government decided to bolster its military strength through conscription. On 10 February 2024, Myanmar enforced compulsory military service under a 2010 law, requiring men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27 to serve at least two years, extendable to five during emergencies. Non-compliance can lead to imprisonment. This enforcement followed three months after the launch of ‘OP.1027’.16

    Reports of forced recruitment have emerged, with accounts of young men being abducted from urban areas and villagers coerced into military service.17 Human Rights Watch reports that over 1,000 Rohingya Muslim men and boys from Rakhine State were forcibly recruited between February and April 2024.18 There are also reports which note of a significant youth exodus. Human rights groups confirm tens of thousands have fled to avoid military service.19 It has become apparent that the popular support for the junta has weakened.

    In September 2024, Myanmar’s military and State Administration Council (SAC) chief invited rebel groups to resolve political issues through “party politics or electoral processes”,20 signaling a reversal from the regime’s previous hardline stance in pursuing dialogue with groups it had previously denounced as ‘terrorists’. In October 2024, though, the SAC reiterated its designation of these rebel and resistance factions as ‘terrorists’. The SAC further issued warnings to international organisations, expressing concerns regarding their potential assistance to armed rebel groups.21

    Along with weakened legitimacy, the junta is also facing increasing international pressure to recognise pro-democratic groups. Japan reduced its diplomatic presence in Myanmar in September 2023 by replacing its ambassador with a chargé d’affaires,22 following similar moves by the US, UK and Australia. ASEAN also faces mounting pressure, internally and from neighbouring countries, due to Myanmar’s non-compliance with the bloc’s Five-Point consensus for resolving the conflict. 23 This state-centric approach, which primarily engages with the formal government,24 is increasingly seen as ineffective because the junta has made little progress towards fulfilling the agreement, particularly in halting violence or initiating inclusive dialogue. In the October 2024 ASEAN Summits, the President of the Philippines acknowledged these concerns, stating:

    We have to admit that although the Five-Point (Consensus) has been out there since 2021, we have not been very successful in actually improving the situation. So, we are trying to think of new strategies.25

    In response to the deteriorating situation, Thailand has taken a proactive step by organising an informal consultation in December 2024.26 The informal nature of this consultation could allow discussions that go beyond the rigid, state-centric approach, potentially engaging non-state actors and local authorities who now hold significant power.

    What Lies Ahead

    Myanmar is at a critical juncture, with no resolution to the civil war in sight. The ruling junta is facing challenges in sustaining the war efforts amid resource strain and waning public morale. The National Unity Government (NUG) interprets these statements as signs of the regime’s possible collapse, and asserts that genuine dialogue with the military is only possible if it guarantees that ‘it no longer has a role in politics’.27 With anti-junta forces gaining ground, questions linger about whether the different armed groups would continue to fight for the larger cause of a democratic and federal Myanmar. There are also fears of balkanisation of the country.28 While resistance efforts in major cities have yet to achieve the success seen in peripheral areas, the junta is unlikely to regain lost territory, focusing instead on defending critical towns and supply routes. Although anti-junta forces remain disinterested in negotiations and face limited international support, they continue to advocate for a federal democratic structure.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    Keywords: 
    Myanmar

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