For better operational cooperation, India and China need to go beyond rudimentary agreements on combating piracy and crime in the Western Indian Ocean. They need to work out an acceptable framework for functional collaboration and create positive momentum in favour of greater strategic interaction.
After a successful visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Colombo in March, Indian policy elite are hopeful that the new Sri Lankan government will roll-back some of the geopolitical concessions made by the Rajapaksa regime to Beijing, thereby restoring India’s primacy in its near neighbourhood. India’s policy elite are hopeful that Maithripala Sirisena, the new president, will roll back some of the geopolitical concessions made by his predecessor to Beijing, thereby restoring Indian primacy in its near neighbourhood.
The epistemology of maritime strategic thought is a subject of growing interest and discussion among maritime analysts today. In a world where national interest is increasingly defined by maritime connectivity and overseas influence, nations have been investing considerable military and diplomatic energy in developing a nautical blueprint for future growth. Forging a comprehensive maritime strategy has, however, not been easy as strategic thinking on maritime issues has swung erratically between a rapidly evolving present and a sharply unpredictable future.
The new version of US maritime strategy candidly recognises China’s maritime expansion and territorial claims as a source of regional unrest, but stops short of recognising the A2/AD challenge even as it pronounces “all-domain access” as a strategic prerequisite.
Since 2012, the Gulf of Guinea has emerged as one of the most pirate-infested
waters in the world, posing an urgent security threat to the maritime environment. While the total number of piracy incidents world-wide has fallen in recent years… attacks on the west coast of Africa have witnessed a steady rise, now accounting for nearly a fifth of all attacks.
The government’s ‘Act East Policy’ needs to legitimise the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept. Interestingly, only a few months after the release of the 2013 White Paper, Australia released a Country Strategy Document on India which identified the Indian Navy as possessing the most potential for a close maritime partnership
In the event that a ZOP is announced, it is India that will stand to lose the most because its proposal will be seen as a ‘backdoor’ manoeuvre to limit the Chinese presence and an effective abdication of leadership and responsibility in the IOR.
Climate change is likely to influence maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The growing unpredictability in climate and weather patterns is having a disproportionate impact over the region. Not only is the IOR predicted to bear the brunt of future climatic changes, it is also likely to face strong constraints in meeting the coming threats. The effect of climate change on human security in the IOR is only likely to be matched by the impact of extreme weather conditions on naval operations and the security of maritime assets.
China’s announcement of a 10 billion Yuan ($1.6 billion) fund to finance the “maritime silk road plan” is a clear sign that it is serious about moving ahead with its stated plans. For India, it is instructive that the sales pitch of shared economic gains does not conceal the MSR’s real purpose: ensuring the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
Modi’s China Visit – Allaying Maritime Misgivings
For better operational cooperation, India and China need to go beyond rudimentary agreements on combating piracy and crime in the Western Indian Ocean. They need to work out an acceptable framework for functional collaboration and create positive momentum in favour of greater strategic interaction.