Despite the talk about India having key strategic interests in Afghanistan, it neither has the necessary resources nor the clout to influence developments in Afghanistan.
There is no cause for dismay over a growing sense of marginalisation of India in regional and international forums on the Afghan issue. Similarly, the resurgence of the Taliban and increasing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan should be seen as a temporary phenomenon. Sushant Sareen is right in arguing that the ‘turn of events’ in the ‘not so distant future’ could open up possibilities of India playing a larger role in Afghanistan.
The Afghan war has a long way to go. The situation has come to a point where with every passing month one wonders where the war is headed. There can be no doubt that it will be long before Afghanistan will be at peace with itself. At this moment, there does not seem to be any solution to the Afghan crisis. The Taliban and their allies, both Afghan and foreign, have notably succeeded in transforming the war to their advantage.
A new actor was inducted in the decades-old Afghan conflict when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. NATO's entry into the Afghan theatre took place in the backdrop of the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. With the United States diverting its resources and greater attention to Iraq, NATO was to expand its operations throughout Afghanistan in support of the US-led coalition force in a phased manner.
The Jabhe-e-Melli or the National Front (NF) is largely considered inconsequential in Afghan politics. It is often dismissed as a loose mlange of elements from the former United Front or the Northern Alliance, some ex-communists, and former royalists, which is bound to wither away sooner than later. The Front is said to represent the interests of a political class which is disgruntled with the politics and the policies of President Hamid Karzai, and which is struggling to preserve its erstwhile status and relevance in the power politics of Afghanistan.
The paper attempts to examine diverse challenges to the making of the new Afghan National Army (ANA), and its future prospects. The issue assumes significance as the Taliban shift battle lines outside the Pashtun areas and there is growing difference among Western countries regarding the means and approaches to be used to stabilize Afghanistan. The paper is broadly divided into four sections. The first section seeks to identify and critically examine the role played by key institutional structures responsible for the training and mentoring of the new national army.
India’s Limited Options in Afghanistan
Despite the talk about India having key strategic interests in Afghanistan, it neither has the necessary resources nor the clout to influence developments in Afghanistan.