Human history has been witness to many war crimes and atrocities. But it is only in the twentieth century that one sees institutionalised, global attempts to fix responsibility for such crimes and to bring justice to the victims of such unspeakable, horrific crimes against humanity. However, most would agree that these attempts have hardly made a huge difference either in getting justice for victims and giving them closure or in deterring such crimes. Through War Crimes, Atrocity, and Justice, Michael J.

The book contains 10 articles from presentations made by Western scholars (including officers from the defence forces) at the Royal Danish Defence College, in 2011, and has been edited by N.B. Paulsen, K.H. Galster and S. Nørby. Their historical research brings out that coalition warfare is not a new phenomenon, and has been practised by nations for different reasons. While, in most cases, countries came together when they faced a common threat and did not have the strength (manpower, finances or military power) to counter it, often it was to regain their pride and prestige in the world.

In the academic field of modern history studies, historians dealing with South Asia largely neglect the historical evolution of military–strategic thought on the Indian subcontinent. It is also true that, both for political scientists and scholars of the specialized field of strategy, it is not very common to find people engaging with theories other than Western theories of warfare.1 Nevertheless, the new generation of scholars has started to deal with these subjects.

Targeted air strikes remain a cornerstone fighting technique in modern counter-insurgency and other military operations. Yet, scholars and practitioners remain divided on the question of the efficacy of this battle mechanism. This article examines some of the underlying assumptions made in their previous analyses, and serves to nuance those approaches. Specifically, it looks at war, not as a static phenomenon but rather as a constantly evolving environment—one where such aerial campaigns affect insurgent counter-strike capabilities and decisions.