Not engaging North Korea is no more seen as an option even as it continue to build its nuclear capabilities.

Since the infliction of unacceptable damage may not deter Pakistan from breaking the nuclear taboo, a ‘tit for tat’ strategy in case of lower order nuclear use is worth considering.

Even the otherwise vague 2011 NSG public statement which inserted the NPT angle into the guidelines underlined that the NSG would implement the India-specific exemptions fully.

An anti-nuclear movement in India would remain largely a marginal movement with sporadic spurts depending on the issue at hand, the site in question and the political parties involved.

Though Global Zero’s ‘umbrella activism’ involving current and past policy practitioners and the general public alike can be expected to gain further momentum in the near future, its continued vitality may however be captive to the pressures of the timeline within which its vision is intended to be achieved.

A continuation of Australia’s ban on the sale of uranium to India is likely to hinder the goal of building a strategic partnership and exploring complementarities in the defence and maritime domain.

Under the November 2010 statement issued by India and the United States, India is committed to take only one step: harmonizing its export controls with those of all the four multilateral export controls regimes.

The increasing debate after the Fukushima crisis has undermined the recent renaissance of nuclear power and is likely to usher in greater regulation and stringent safety measures, making alternative sources of energy cheaper and therefore more appealing.

To resolve the challenge posed by the NPT criteria, the best solution would be to amend the NPT and accommodate India as a nuclear weapon state.