Jeeram Ghati area is part of the Maoist's annual Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign. 2014 is a significant year on two counts: one, it is the tenth year of formation of CPI (Maoist) that requires a show of its strength and lethal prowess, and two, that general elections, scheduled in April-May, need to be disrupted. It, therefore, does pose a serious challenge to the security forces in the immediate future.

The recent violent incidents carried out by the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) in the sensitive eastern and north-eastern parts India have serious security implications. Conscious intervention of the centre in concert with the state governments of West Bengal and Assam and even Sikkim, as well as with cooperation of the Bhutan government is required at the earliest.

Citing IDSA Report, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, RSN Singh said in the Rajya Sabha recently that “…the CPI(Maoist) party has been collecting not less than Rs 140 crores annually from a variety of sources. Further, the possibility of certain front organizations of the CPI (Maoist) … clandestinely getting foreign funds cannot be ruled out.”

India’s security strategy for the economic corridors and connectivity will have to entail water tight anti-drugs control measures and mechanisms to snuff out the possibilities of surges in narcotics trafficking that may result from better connectivity and established networks of peoples across the region.

To reshape public confidence further, the Union Home Ministry should quickly address the long festering issue of redeploying at least one regiment of the sashastra seema bal (SSB) in Ladakh. Initially raised as Special Service Bureau in the 1960s, SSB effectively involved natives for building a second line of defence against adversaries.

The CPI (Maoist) is fully aware that a movement of this magnitude cannot sustain on its own for long without any external support; be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge or ideological support. Given India’s geopolitical location, it would come as no surprise if the CPI (Maoist), through its aggressive efforts, is able to garner substantive resources for its disposal.

Compared to the worst Maoists-affected state of Odisha, in the neighbouring states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the level of violence has come down substantially. In the coming years, Malkangiri and other south-western border districts of Odisha will continue to bleed because of the Maoist quest for safe havens in these districts during hot pursuit by the Chhattisgarh police.

Foremost on the government’s defence and national security reforms agenda should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including that for internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review and must take the public into confidence.

The recent violence indicates that armed groups have not disarmed and that state forces are simply unable to keep “extortion” networks in check. While the cease-fire agreement signed in 1997 has been the harbinger of the subsequent peace talks, blatant violations of the agreement by the outfit render the framework of the talks weak and question its effectiveness and legitimacy.