S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: The initial diplomatic efforts on the Iranian nuclear issue were spearheaded by the United Kingdom, France and Germany (E3). Some of the few instances of successful engagement were the Tehran Agreed Statement of October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 that Iran entered into with the E3. The E3 engagement process, however, hit a roadblock in the light of Iran’s decision of August 01, 2005 to resume uranium conversion activities at Isfahan.

The P5+1/E3+3 (made up of five permanent members of the UNSC along with Germany) took forward the process of engagement spearheaded by E3 countries after the Iranian nuclear issue was referred to the UNSC by the IAEA in February 2006. Germany’s involvement therefore began as part of the E3 as early as in 2003 and continued when the negotiation process was expanded to include the other three permanent members of the UNSC in 2006. 

Brazil meanwhile was involved in such efforts as the May 2010 Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear swap deal under the terms of which (similar to the October 2009 deal involving Russia and France) Iran was to have transferred 1200 kgs of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey, in return for 120 kgs of uranium fuel rods from the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France, and the IAEA) within a year of depositing the LEU. The US and France, however, rejected the deal given that Iran’s stockpile of LEU had doubled since October 2009. Such efforts also raised the stakes in the US–Turkey/Brazil bilateral ties, with these countries’ foreign policy efforts seemingly at odds with the US interests and preferences.

For an examination of the various diplomatic-political efforts undertaken to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, please refer to the article, “In Pursuit of a Chimera: Nuclear Imbroglio between Sanctions and Engagement,” Strategic Analysis, Routledge, 36 (6), November 2012.

Kalyanaraman replies: Nazi Germany was determined to establish its primacy in Europe, which meant defeating both the Western powers and the Soviet Union in the East. The Soviet Union was committed to bringing about a world of communism, and like Russians of previous and subsequent decades, Soviet leaders were acutely conscious of the geopolitical imperative of exercising control over their periphery in Eastern Europe. In November 1940, talks between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union centred on Moscow joining the Tripartite Pact (between Germany, Italy and Japan) while at the same time Germany insisted that Soviet Russia not focus on eastern Europe and instead concentrate on territories to its south towards the Indian Ocean. But this was not acceptable to Soviet Russia. This is the backdrop against which we should look at the outbreak of conflict between these two powers. It is known that Hitler had ordered preparations for a war against the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the defeat inflicted on France in the summer of 1940. And after the November 1940 talks failed to make progress, on 18 December 1940, Hitler signed a formal directive to ensure that preparations for a war against Russia be completed by 15 May 1941. For his part, Stalin surely made his own military preparations; but mainstream historians have not so far given credence to the argument that Stalin had plans to change the Soviet military's orientation from a defensive mode into an offensive mode for a invasion of Germany.