S.S. Parmar replies: Threat perceptions are normally based on capabilities and perceived intentions in an area of common interest. The same would apply in the case of China in the Indian Ocean, which apparently appears to be the theme of the question. China’s entry into the Indian Ocean is presently based on economic engagements and ensuring safety of their maritime trade, especially oil, that traverses the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). In order to ensure security of these interests, the presence of the PLAN is normative.

To be perceived as a threat, a Navy must have the ability of firstly presence in adequate numbers and secondly sustained supportable operations. The first aspect requires a good mix of combat ability in all three dimensions – air, surface and sub surface. The Chinese Navy has a big disadvantage in the air dimension, primarily the lack of ship based air cover, and the land based maritime reconnaissance capability due to the distance involved. An aircraft carrier could provide this air cover but it would be restricted in time and space. The second aspect of sustenance of operations would be driven by the number of bases available for resupply and maintenance. Air operations and support from friendly foreign bases is a possibility but nations permitting this type of support would weigh the pros and cons in terms of international pressure, and the aspect of neutrality in the event of a conflict.

India on the other hand has the advantage over China in the Indian Ocean as the proximity of bases and operations over distances in the region are part of its normal operating philosophy, thereby permitting it to be present in adequate numbers. Therefore, presently, the Chinese Navy is not considered a cogent threat.

The aspects covered above permits India to monitor the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean so as to ensure a secure maritime environment. As India believes in and supports the aspect of freedom of navigation in the seas, it would under normal circumstances not like to be viewed as an impediment in another nation’s maritime trade. However, in the event of a conflict, it would have the advantage of monitoring and interdicting Chinese trade traversing the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean.

Jagannath P. Panda replies: To my understanding, India has never instituted or designed its policy towards Nepal to ‘counter Chinese initiatives’. While Beijing’s policy towards Nepal has largely been based on ‘anti-Indian’ proposition, India has always preferred to see Nepal as a traditional South Asian neighbour, and has preferred to maintain a healthy relation at both political and non-political levels. India must boost its economic and commercial interests in Nepal, and must rise to negate China’s endeavor before Beijing utterly dominates Nepalese market and resources. Besides, India should never undermine the strategic location of Nepal that is vital to its national security, as it is closely bordered to both China and Tibet. India’s thrust should be similar to that of the Chinese strategy- ‘maintain good political contacts while pushing the economic and commercial interests ahead.’

Prashant Kumar Singh replies: Any answer to this query will always depend on individual reading and perception of the history.

If one is convinced that the presence of the Dalai Lama has done more harm than good to India, and that India could have bought long-lasting friendship and friction-free relationship with China by unequivocally endorsing Chinese claims over Tibet which in turn would have forestalled the emergence of Sino-Pak axis, one can conclude that it was a strategic mistake on the part of India not to have immediately recognised Tibet as an integral part of China.

However, if one reasons that the friction-free relationship between these two Asian giants is Utopian thinking and a strategic context is bound to be there in their relationship, with Tibet being just one dimension; and that maintaining Tibet as a buffer, though condemned as an imperial legacy, was a prudent strategy to follow, then one would argue that India did not play its Tibet card well in the 1950s.

That India pursued an imperial strategy in Tibet in the 1950s has been basically a Chinese insinuation. The criticism that not recognising Tibet as an integral part of China was a strategic mistake on the part of India is academic acceptance of this Chinese position only. However, the strategy of creating buffers moves beyond ideological contexts. The USSR pursued this strategy vis-à-vis the West, and the USSR and the PRC even vis-à-vis each other. And also, China did treat Tibet as a strategic backyard (or buffer) for the core Han China against the countries lying west of Tibet. Otherwise, China's medieval claims on Tibet are irrelevant in the modern times. Therefore, if at all India was pursuing a policy of retaining and maintaining a buffer in Tibet, this policy was not non-kosher for China. China was also doing exactly the same in Tibet. In the final outcome, what made a difference was who played this policy more deftly.

Furthermore, the semantics apart, India has never challenged Chinese authority over Tibet. In fact, India did a rare favour to China by surrendering its extra-territorial rights on Tibet which it had inherited from the British. Moreover, the Tibet problem is between Tibetans and China, not between India and China. India has not done anything to aggravate this problem in the last 50 years. But unfortunately, China’s insecurity vis-à-vis Tibet is often transmitted on to its relations with India.

The Maoist China was a revolutionary state having strong ideological motivations. It aligned with the USSR and declared hostility towards the US in ideological fervour, discarding American overtures between the 1949 Communist takeover of China and the Korean War. Even before 1949, America had actually stayed away from becoming a party against the communists in the Chinese Civil War. China made the North Korea attack the South Korea because of ideology. Finally, it broke from the alliance with the Soviet Union in its ideological quest for the leadership of the socialist world. In fact, the Maoist China entered into many confrontations with external powers and many a times descended into domestic chaos because of ideology. In this light, asserting that Tibet was the only reason behind the Sino-Indian confrontation is probably incorrect. China's desire to assert superiority of its political system over democratic India and to project itself as the only leader of Asia were probably far more responsible reasons behind Chinese aggression on India in 1962, though India had its own share of strategic and diplomatic mistakes. Therefore, the suggestion that even more unequivocal support to China on Tibet issue would have made a genuine difference to the Sino-Indian relations does not carry much conviction.

However, a valid criticism of India's Tibet policy in the 1950s is that it became a hotchpotch of idealism and realism. Neither idealism nor realism got a full play in this policy. The diagnosis about Chinese presence in Tibet was quite realist but the prescriptions followed were somewhat idealist, which could not withstand the heat of the events as they unfolded in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Namrata Goswami replies: The influence of China’s growth on northeast India can be two-folds. The first is one in which the people of the northeast could get inspired by the Chinese economic growth model, especially in its south western province of Yunnan, and emulate such a globalising model. Already, the chief ministers of the region are ardent supporters of the “Look East” policy which aims to create land and rail connectivity between India’s northeast, Myanmar, and Yunnan in China. This could foster economic connectivity and bring in prosperity to the northeast. The other influence is more security related. China’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh and its water diversion plans on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet are creating a public perception in the northeast that China is a threat to India. Hence, while China’s influence with regard to economic connectivity could be positive, its territorial claim and water diversion plans are negative influences.

Similar is the case with the Indian Ocean. China views the Indian Ocean, especially the Malacca Strait, as the lifeline for its energy supplies and exports, which is critical to maintaining its internal growth. It wants to collaborate with other Indian Ocean countries to ensure the safety of these lanes. However, China is an authoritarian regime with a closed political system. Hence, its military modernisation, acquisition of an aircraft carrier and assertive claims on the South China Sea is creating an atmosphere of militarisation of international waters. The Chinese influence is thus highly securitised.