Jagannath P. Panda replies: Debates and dialogues across Asia continue over the process of East Asia economic integration. These discussions continue in the backdrop of the United States ‘pivot’ Asia policy, and continuing tensions over disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, which is touching new climax. The main thrust behind the East Asian economic integration has been ASEAN+6 Agreement and the East Asian Summit (EAS); where the aim and idea is to build a stable Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECP) among the countries in Asia. The ASEAN+6 RECP is aimed at transforming the region by higher economic growth through more cross-border trade and investment. Among these developments, the India-ASEAN relationship seems to be on constant move and on ascendancy. The relationship between India and the ASEAN seems to be touching new realities, with up-gradation of relationship to strategic partnership during the December 2012 India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit.

India would like ASEAN+6 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to materialize as soon as possible. This will help in furthering the aims and objectives of India’s own Look-East Policy. RCEP will have huge trade potential. In real practice, RCEP once formalized, is supposed to emerge as the most effective and largest free-trade bloc in the world. It will bring ten ASEAN countries and other six countries (China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand) together. These six members have FTAs with the ASEAN currently. If it materializes, it is supposed to be one of the most vital free-trade blocs in the world; the combined geo-political resources would put the grouping into a totally different league, making it the most important economic grouping of the world. The idea of RCEP negotiations is a new one; and was mainly discussed during the East Asian Summit in Phnom Penh (Cambodia) in November 2012.

Clubbing with the ASEAN has been a principal policy priority for both China and India. At present, while China has clubbed with the ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, India is clubbed only under the ASEAN+6 framework. Compared with India, the Chinese have always enjoyed closer contact with the ASEAN through a versatile engagement policy that includes building up a variety of economic, political and cultural linkages. Officially, China wants to promote and has asked for ‘ASEAN’s leading role in regional cooperation’ in East Asia under ASEAN+1 or ASEAN+3 frameworks. Beijing has developed and pushed for a range of ‘practical cooperation’ in the fields of infrastructure, connectivity, trade and economy, capital and information, transport and people-to-people exchanges. The former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had pointed out recently that, in 2010, ‘China became ASEAN’s biggest trading partner [...] launched the largest FTA among developing countries and [ . . . ] set the target of $500 billion in two-way trade by 2015’. India must take a serious note of this Chinese intent, and accordingly maximize its trade and economic contacts with the region.

Jagannath P. Panda replies: In order to craft a more decisive policy towards Southeast Asia, India capitalizes on maximizing trade and economic contacts with the ASEAN, which is the prime multilateral body that connects Asia’s three key regions together: South Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia. The thrust has been to capitalise on the ‘strategic partnership’ between India and the ASEAN. Though trade and economic relationship, key to the India-ASEAN partnership, has been growing, it is yet to realise its fill potential.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently described the growing India-ASEAN relationship and partnership agreement as “transformational”, aimed at pushing India-ASEAN trade to almost $200 billion in the next decade; setting a realistic target of $100 billion trade by 2015. The last one-decade trade contacts between the two sides suggest that bilateral trade and economic contacts have been on ascendancy, mainly since the FTA has come into force between the two sides (See the chart below).

(Note: Trade Figures are in approximate and compiled from open sources)

While air and road infrastructure linkages could be one viable way to maximize the trade, the focus should also be on maritime engagements. Bilateral trade and economic engagements between India and the ASEAN has been the main hallmark of this relationship over the years. After the signing of the FTA in goods between India and the ASEAN, the bilateral trade has massively increased to 41 per cent during the year 2011-12, almost reaching $80 billion. The December 2012 India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit saw the signing of the FTA on services and investment, which would certainly help in further maximizing the trade and economic engagement in times to come. Besides, the FTA on services and investment will certainly be beneficial to the Indian economy, especially in terms of further integrating India into the Southeast Asian economies.

For both China and India, the primary contention in their engagement with ASEAN is: who will have an edge in the ASEAN-led regional politics? Both are concerned about the geographic scope of the Asian community building. Chinese officials and scholars are worried about India’s recent revitalized approach towards the ASEAN and South-East Asia. Chinese officials do notice India’s presence and activities in the region quite seriously. If India manages to integrate itself more actively with the ASEAN and South-East Asia, ASEAN and India will be in a win–win situation when countries in the region start looking for India’s greater role, particularly in terms of economic integration at least if not in other areas, undercutting China’s influence in the region. Beijing, it may be noted, had vigorously opposed India’s association with the East Asia Summit (EAS). China has always pointedly avoided advocating a leading role for ASEAN+6 or EAS, canvassing to limit the dialogue to ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3.

Reply: In the fiftieth year of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Journal of Defence Studies (an IDSA Journal) has put together a Special Issue that analyses the causes of the conflict as well as lessons for the present. The entire Special Issue can be accessed at http://www.idsa.in/jds/6_4_2012

Also, refer to R. Sukumaran, “The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of Air Power”, Strategic Analysis, 27 (3), July 2003, at http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/The1962IndiaChinaWarandKargil1999_r...

Following comments appeared on the subject on the IDSA website:

The Two Myths of 1962,
By Ramesh Phadke, October 31, 2012
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheTwoMythsof1962_RameshPhadke_301012

Who started the fighting?
By R. S. Kalha, October 17, 2012
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Whostartedthefighting%3F_R.S.Kalha_171012

Who Started the Fighting---- The Sequel
By R. S. Kalha, October 28, 2012
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhoStartedtheFightingTheSequel_rskalha_2...

What did China Gain at the End of the Fighting in November 1962?
By R. S. Kalha, November 21, 2012
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatdidChinaGain%20attheEndoftheFighting...

Reply: Refer to an earlier reply to a similar query by Sarabjeet Singh Parmar at http://idsa.in/askanexpert/Whatarethestrategicandsecurityimplications

Mandip Singh replies: The India-China military exercises are a part of confidence building measures (CBMs) that contribute towards a peaceful, just and fair settlement of the India-China border dispute based on historical evidence and international law. These CBMs were signed in 1993 and 2006 and continue to be revisited to further improve the understanding and engagement between the two militaries. The first naval exercises between the two countries were held in 2003, off the coast of Kochi, and in 2005, in East China Sea. The first army exercise code named 'Hand in Hand' was held in Kunming in China in 2007, and the next year in Belgaum in India.

Military relations were disrupted after China denied visa to India's Northern Army Commander, Lt General B.S. Jaswal. It was only during the visit of China's Minister of Defence, Liang Guanglie, to India in September 2012 that there was a thaw in the relations. At the 5th Annual Defence Dialogue held at Beijing on 14-15 January 2013, it was agreed to resume the exercises between the two militaries of all three services - Army, Navy and Air Force. At no time has Pakistan been an influence in this relationship. The engagements between the two militaries have nothing to do with India’s relations with Pakistan, nor are these exercises relevant to China-Pakistan relations.

The fact that China and India have moved ahead with resumption of these military exercises, unconditionally, and with no caveat is an indicator of the mutual understanding between the two countries to carry forward the engagement and dialogue to the next level. There is no reason to believe and no indications to suggest that China may not be ‘serious’ to go ahead with these exercises. It may be prudent to recount that, besides political dividends, such exercises develop understanding, foster goodwill and assist in establishing standard operating procedures between two militaries when operating jointly in humanitarian and disaster relief missions.

Reply: Refer to the IDSA Issue Brief titled, ‘An Assessment of Manmohan Singh’s Visit to Myanmar’ by Udai Bhanu Singh, at
http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/AnAssessmentofManmohanSinghsVisittoMyanmar

Rukmani Gupta: There is no evidence to suggest that the development of bilateral trade between India and China has adversely affected the settlement of the boundary question between the two countries. India and China have committed to a negotiated settlement of the boundary question, and 15 rounds of talks on the boundary issue attest to this. While working towards a negotiated settlement, the two countries have emerged as leading global economies and it is thus unsurprising that their economic ties have also grown. Even though China is an important trading partner, it cannot be suggested that the economic ties impinge on India's position on the boundary question. Mutual economic interests may be seen as creating stakes for the maintenance of peace between countries, but these cannot be the rationale for decisions affecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity.