Rup Narayan Das replies: In order to put the issue in perspective, it is worth while to revisit history for a moment. Concerned at the growing Russian interests in Tibet in early 1900s, the British Government in India had sent a military mission to Lhasa under Col. Younghusband in 1904, which led to the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention the same year. By this agreement, the British secured the right to establish Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung in Tibet, as also a commitment about the express exclusion of any other foreign power from political influence there. Anticipating political complications in the region, the British Government invited both the Tibetan and Chinese representatives to a tripartite conference at Simla in October 1913. The draft tripartite convention while recognising Chinese suzerainty over Tibet also expressly stipulated for the autonomy of Tibet. China, however, declined to accept the convention. Subsequently, a bilateral agreement was signed between Tibet and Great Britain, and a formal declaration issued, barring the Chinese Government from enjoying any privileges accruing from the Simla Agreement so long as it did not ratify it. Thus, the McMahon line is based on the Simla Conference.

The Simla Agreement continued to be basis of Anglo-Tibetan relations till the British withdrawal from India in 1947. In July 1947, the British Government in India formally informed the Tibetan Government that after the transfer of power, British obligations and rights under the existing treaties would devolve upon India (for details, see Nancy Jetlly, India China Relations 1947-1977, Radiant Publishers, 1979, pp. 13-14). When India became independent on August 15, 1947, it acquired the latent boundary dispute with China in the Eastern sector - the McMahon Line.

On November 20, 1950, while responding to a question whether India has got any well-defined boundary with Tibet, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru stated in the parliament that the frontier from the eastwards has been defined by the McMahon Line which was fixed by the Simla Convention. He declared, “Our map show that the McMahon line is our boundary - map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that boundary and we will not allow anybody to come across its boundary”.

Jagannath P. Panda replies: Like India, China has been of the view that there should be special categories to address the challenges of climate change in accordance with the interests and domestic priorities of the developing world. For example, taking the support of developing countries at the 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, the head of the Chinese delegation, Xie Zhenhua, had stated: ‘climate change has emerged as a challenge basically due to unrestricted emissions by developed countries in their process of industrialisation, and developing countries remain the victims of climate change negotiation process’. Moreover, China has officially noted that it continues to help the developing countries to deal with the challenges of climate challenge, and that Beijing has earmarked $200 million in this regard. Also, China has financed climate change programmes in Africa, including in some least developed and small island countries; and, it has tried to bring a ‘South-South’ outlook in its stance on meeting the challenges posed by climate change.

China to date remains the largest emitter of CO2 in the world and causes almost a quarter of the current global greenhouse gas emissions. Among the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa - India stands next to China as a leading emitter of CO2. BRICS, thus, is one forum where India must cooperate with China in climate change negotiations. Besides, China is also a member of BASIC along with Brazil, South Africa and India, where climate change issues are debated and addressed in an open manner. BASIC was created in December 2009 at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during the COP15 in Copenhagen. The politics just before the COP15 sufficiently indicated that developed countries would not initiate steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions if developing countries fail to do so, pointing mainly towards the two largest emitters from the developing world- China and India. Though in principle the BASIC countries agreed to carry forward climate change negotiations under the framework of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Roadmap, they realised that there has to be a greater understanding on the issue among the BASIC countries, making China-India cooperation a crucial one in this regard.

Overall, both BRICS and BASIC justify the ‘South-South’ bonding to an extent, and offer a greater scope for cooperation in the ‘developing world’ on the issue of climate change. Therefore, India and China must cooperate in multilateral forums on climate change negotiations.

Reply: Please refer to the report of the IDSA Roundtable, “Is India-Nepal-China Trilateral Cooperation Possible?”, at http://www.idsa.in/event/IsIndiaNepalChinatrilateralCooperationpossible

Reply: Please refer to an earlier reply by Rukmani Gupta to a similar query, at http://idsa.in/askanexpert/IndiasapproachtowardstheIndoPacificregion

Reply: Kindly refer to P. Stobdan’s article on China’s intrusion in Ladakh, titled, “The Ladakh Drift”, at http://www.idsa.in/idsanews/PStobdansonChinasIntrusioninLadakh

Reply: Kindly refer to the following recent & other publications on our website:

V. Mahalingam, “Daulat Beg Oldie Standoff: An Assessment”, IDSA Issue Brief, May 22, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/DaulatBegOldiestandoff_vmahalingam_220513

R. S. Kalha, “The Chinese Message and What Should the Reply Be?”, May 21, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheChineseMessageIndiareply_rskalha_210513

Kasturi Moitra, “What India needs to learn from China”, May 20, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatIndianeedstolearnfromChina_kmoitra_200513

Mukul Sanwal, “India and China: Strategic partners in global governance reform”, May 16, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaandChinaStrategicpartners_msanwal_160513

Mandip Singh, “Lure your enemy onto the roof, then take away the ladder”, May 13, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Lureyourenemyontotheroofthentakeawaytheladder_msingh_150513

Arvind Gupta, “Chinese lessons in diplomacy”, May 12, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Chineselessonsindiplomacy_agupta_120513

Mandip Singh, “Lessons from Somdurong Chu Incident”, April 26, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/CurrentChineseincursionLessonsfromSomdurongChuIncident_msingh_260413

Arvind Gupta, “China’s Defence White Paper 2013: Lessons for India”, April 25, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasDefenceWhitePaper2013LessonsforIndia_agupta_250413

Mandip Singh, “Critical Assessment of China's Vulnerabilities in Tibet”, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 30, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/CriticalAssessmentofChinasVulnerabilitiesinTibet

R. N. Das, “India-China Relations: A New Paradigm”, IDSA Monograph Series No. 19, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/monograph/IndiaChinaRelations_rndas

Mandip Singh, “Increasing Chinese Footprint in India's North West: What should India do?”, October 21, 2011, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/IncreasingChineseFootprintinIndiasNorthWest_msingh_211011

Arvind Gupta, “China’s Changing Worldview”, August 4, 2009, at http://www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/ChinasChangingWorldview_AGupta_040809